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Arbitrage normally ensures that covered interest parity (CIP) holds.
Until recently, excess proﬁts, if any, were documented to last merely
seconds and reach a few pips. Instead, this paper ﬁnds that following
the Lehman bankruptcy, these were large, persisted for months and
involved strategies short in dollars. Proﬁts are estimated by specify-
ing the arbitrage strategy as a speculator would actually implement it,
considering both unsecured and secured funding. Either way, it seems
that dollar funding constraints kept traders from arbitraging away ex-
cess proﬁts. The claim ﬁnds support in an empirical analysis drawing
on several novel high frequency datasets of synchronous quotes across
securities, including transaction costs.
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A system’s dynamics often stand out more clearly when observed under
some strain. Connections too faint to be noticed are ampliﬁed and relations
too complex to be grasped are untangled. In this sense, the recent ﬁnancial
crisis has opened new ﬁelds of research and turned attention to questions
formerly overlooked. Such is the case for the covered interest parity condition
(CIP) which, until the Lehman bankruptcy, was assumed to hold without
reservations and used widely to price forward exchange rate contracts. The
CIP condition was perceived to be solidly anchored in riskless arbitrage, a
notion essential and ubiquitous in ﬁnance for asset pricing.
But even such fundamental conditions have their limits. Keynes, already
in 1923, expressed the intuition that the CIP condition may be violated if
“speculation is exceptionally active and is all one way. It must be remem-
bered that the ﬂoating capital normally available...for the purpose of taking
advantage of moderate arbitrage...is by no means unlimited in amount” and
thus excess proﬁts, when they arise, persist until “fresh capital [is drawn] into
the arbitrage business” (Keynes, 1923). Today, in our modern, highly eﬃ-
cient markets, it seems that Keynes’ intuition still applies: in the months
following the Lehman bankruptcy, the CIP condition broke down and arbi-
trage opportunities were left unexploited, a situation exacerbated ﬁrst and
foremost by the lack of funding liquidity in dollars.
This paper has two goals: ﬁrst of documenting CIP deviations during the
crisis and second of explaining them. Documentation begins with an eﬀort
to specify the arbitrage strategy as a speculator would actually implement
it. Two approaches are considered. The ﬁrst, closer to the operations of a
bank’s proprietary trading desk (prop desk), involves rolling over overnight
unsecured money market positions across currencies, and hedging interest
rate risk using overnight index swap (OIS) contracts. The second, more
symptomatic of a hedge fund, suggests borrowing and lending against col-
lateral, using repo contracts. We call the ﬁrst unsecured arbitrage and the
second secured. Data, relative to each strategy, come from novel datasets
oﬀering multiple daily snapshots of interbank quotes, synchronous across se-
curities and, in most cases, inclusive of transaction costs. Deviations from
the CIP condition of up to 360 bps annualized appear incontestably after the
Lehman bankruptcy, and last until year-end. They are somewhat smaller
and less persistent, though, than those found in earlier studies which use
more coarse data. Furthermore, deviations from CIP are (i) currency spe-
ciﬁc and (ii) directional, in the sense that they appear on trades involving
the US dollar and, speciﬁcally, in which the dollar is the funding currency.
In short, insuﬃcient arbitrage ﬂows failed to exert the necessary pressure
on the forward forex market, leaving the forward rate “mis-priced” according
to CIP. Speciﬁcally, during the post Lehman period, the dollar was too cheap
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on the forward market, as compared to the rate suggested by the CIP con-
dition. While those traders who did have access to dollar funding probably
made hefty proﬁts at very low risk from CIP arbitrage at the height of the
crisis, to most others this opportunity merely remained out of reach; thus,
to speak of excess returns from CIP arbitrage means that potential proﬁts
were left unexploited.
But why did arbitrage break down? That is the focus of the second
part of this paper. Two hypotheses are entertained, one emphasizing risk
and the other liquidity factors. The distinction is useful also because se-
cured arbitrage, as opposed to unsecured, removes many of the trading risks
and therefore oﬀers a natural experiment to test the importance of risks on
excess returns. More generally, this paper’s empirical analysis suggests liq-
uidity factors dominate. Dollar funding was rationed due to deleveraging
imperatives, prudential hoarding in the face of growing internal funding and
liquidity needs, as well as limited capital to pledge in exchange for liquid
funds. In this light, the erosion of excess proﬁts and stabilization of the CIP
condition at the end of 2008 can be explained by the return of dollar liquidity
on money markets, in great part due to the generous central bank swap lines
established in the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy.
Several studies precede this paper in exploring deviations from CIP, start-
ing with Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977). More recently, several papers have
focussed on the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis and have deservedly received sig-
niﬁcant attention in both academic and policy circles. The studies include
Baba, Packer, and Nagano (2008), later expanded into Baba and Packer
(2008, 2009), as well as Coﬀey, Hrung, Nguyen, and Sarkar (2009), Gen-
berg, Hui, Wong, and Chung (2009) and Jones (2009). Yet, all approach the
question of CIP deviations using Libor rates across currencies as a measure
of funding costs, to be compared to the forward premium (the diﬀerence
between the forward and spot exchange rates). This raises four issues.
First, these data are somewhat diﬀerent than those that a trader would
have faced. Libor rates are an ask price, are indicative and perhaps biased
due to mis-representation or strategic signaling. In fact, the accuracy of
Libor rates during the crisis became an important subject of controversy, as
pointed out by McAndrews (2009).
Second, Libor rates are only available at 11 am London time, thus often
not matching the time stamp of the foreign exchange quotes used. This issue
is bound to have been especially important during the crisis given the extreme
market volatility. Jones (2009) attempts to circumvent the problem by using
data on interest rate futures, but admits these may have been relatively
illiquid and their inﬂexible nature would have limited their use in arbitrage.
Third, Libor rates used in the above mentioned studies are of relatively
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long maturities: 1 or 3 months. But, as documented by Taylor and Williams
(2009), their respective markets became exceptionally illiquid during the cri-
sis. This suggests traders would have turned to other markets or used much
shorter maturity instruments to undertake arbitrage strategies. That is in-
deed the approach taken in this paper.
Finally, and importantly, transaction costs grew considerably during the
crisis, as will be shown later, a factor overlooked in the above mentioned
literature but important to replicate traders’ actual proﬁt opportunities.
The papers that have used ﬁner data are few and pre-date the crisis. The
four that stand out are Taylor (1989), Rhee and Chang (1992), Akram, Rime,
and Sarno (2008) and Fong, Valente, and Fung (2009, forthcoming). These
papers all use high frequency data, synchronous among the various markets
under study, and inclusive of bid-ask spreads as a measure of transaction
costs. In most cases, though, the datasets typically span just a few months.
This paper also provides empirical grounding to the wider, currently very
dynamic, and mostly theoretical literature on market freezes, in which liquid-
ity issues often play a central role in explaining limits to arbitrage. But in-
stead of oﬀering a blanket review here, relevant works are mentioned through-
out this paper, in support of hypotheses raised to explain CIP arbitrage
proﬁts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses how CIP
arbitrage is implemented in practice and derives corresponding speciﬁcations
of payoﬀs. Section 2 reviews the relevant data and oﬀers estimations of
excess proﬁts from arbitrage. Section 3 focusses on explaining these. It
begins by laying out possible hypotheses and tests these in a subsequent
empirical analysis. Note that in this paper the following terms are used
interchangeably: excess returns or proﬁts from CIP arbitrage, CIP deviations
and breakdown of CIP.
1 The structure of CIP arbitrage
1.1 Two types of traders
Basic CIP arbitrage entails borrowing in one currency and lending in another
to take advantage of the interest rate diﬀerential while avoiding exchange rate
risk. The trade is usually described as borrowing in currency k at an interest
cost of rk,t, exchanging the sum to currency j using the spot forex market,
lending the proceeds in currency j at a rate rj,t, and eventually exchanging
the principal and accrued interest back to currency k to reimburse the original
loan with interest. The latter transaction is undertaken using a forward forex
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contract thereby eliminating exchange rate risk.




(1 + rj,t) − (1 + rk,t) (1)
where the spot exchange rate St is expressed as the price in currency k of
one unit of currency j. The same is true of the forward exchange rate, Ft···T,
where the subscript captures the time the contract is written and its maturity.
Because all variables are known at time t, as emphasized by the shared
subscripts, textbooks point out that CIP arbitrage is riskless and should
therefore yield zero proﬁts. When re-arranged with z1,t = 0, the above
equation is often referred to as the “CIP no arbitrage condition”, or just the
“CIP condition” for short.
But the above characterization of the CIP condition leaves out important
details mostly related to implementation – central, of course, to this paper.
What instruments are used to borrow and lend? What transactions are
undertaken? Are there, contrarily to the textbook simpliﬁcation, hidden
costs and risks in a CIP arbitrage trade? What is the term over which CIP
arbitrage should hold?1
There are two general types of traders involved in CIP arbitrage: hedge
funds and prop desks of large ﬁnancial institutions (banks). The distinction
is the same as that in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Importantly,
each trader typically operates on diﬀerent funding markets. Hedge funds
tend to borrow and lend on secured terms, while banks tend to tap the
unsecured interbank market.2 Each strategy involves diﬀerent interest rates
and maturities, and has diﬀerent risk and liquidity implications. This paper
considers both. We refer to the ﬁrst as secured CIP arbitrage and to the
second as unsecured. The comprehensive trade is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where
the trader stands between lender L and borrower B, with whom she entertains
either unsecured or secured money market transactions. The trader also
engages in a spot and a forward transaction with her forex counterparty. All
in all, the ﬁgure highlights the four transactions involved in CIP arbitrage.
The following two sections work out the details and payoﬀs of the unsecured
and secured arbitrage strategies.
1Note, in passing, that if there were risks in a CIP trade, it could not, strictly speaking,
be called arbitrage. Yet, we continue to use the term as is commonly done in the literature.
2Note that hybrid strategies are also possible: borrowing on secured terms and lending
on unsecured terms, but these are not considered in this paper for expositional clarity, and
because resulting excess proﬁts are a simple positive transformation of the ﬁrst two cases.
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1.2 Unsecured CIP arbitrage
Unsecured CIP arbitrage involves rolling over overnight unsecured money
market positions. The reason for using the overnight market is to beneﬁt from
greater liquidity and less counterparty default and term risk. The strategy
is therefore cheaper on the borrowing side and less risky on the lending side









j,t···T) − (1 + r
C,A
k,t···T) (2)
where as earlier the subscript t···T indicates the time of purchase and ma-
turity of a security, respectively, and rC
j,t···T are the cumulative interest rates























where r without a superscript captures overnight lending rates.
The last thing to note in the above equations are the B and A super-
scripts. These denote bid and ask quotes, respectively, to incorporate trans-
action costs related to arbitrage. We assume, as is standard, that the trader
pays the ask quotes on what she acquires and the bid quotes on what she
sells.3
An immediate drawback from such a strategy is interest rate risk. At time
t, the above merely reﬂects the expectation of the future path of overnight
interest rates, from which, of course, actual rates may vary substantially.
Traders typically hedge this risk by engaging in appropriate interest rate
swaps, in this case using overnight index swaps, or OIS.
An OIS is a ﬁxed/ ﬂoating interest rate swap with the ﬂoating leg tied to
the eﬀective unsecured interbank overnight rate, such as the Federal Funds
rate in the US, the EONIA in the euroarea, or the SONIA in the UK. A trader
borrowing cash overnight in currency k will want to hold an OIS contract
3The bid and ask quotes on the forex market perhaps deserve an additional explanation:
when a trader buys currency j while selling currency k in the spot market, she pays the
ask price for the jk exchange rate, where, by convention, the exchange rate is the price
of the currency cited ﬁrst in units of that cited second (such as for EURUSD, where the
exchange rate is the price in dollars of one euro).
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requiring her to pay a ﬁxed rate and paying her a ﬂexible rate equal, in
fact, to the rate she pays on her short cash position. Intuitively, the ﬂexible
interest rate streams cancel each other out, leaving the trader to pay a ﬁxed














where the absence of bid or ask quotes on the right hand side captures the
fact that the ﬂexible leg of the OIS is indexed on an eﬀective, or traded, rate.
To summarize, the trader rolls over overnight money market positions,
short in currency k and long in currency j. She then hedges away interest
rate risk with a long position in a currency k OIS contract and a short position
in a currency j OIS contract. As a result, the trader’s expected payoﬀ from
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1.3 Secured CIP arbitrage
The trader in this situation (hedge fund), pledges capital to obtain a secured
loan from lender L. It then turns around and oﬀers funds to borrower B
against collateral. In practice, to the extent that foreign currency collateral is
accepted, the hedge fund can use at least some of the collateral received from
borrower B to pledge to lender L. But we simplify the conceptual framework
again for expositional purposes, requiring the hedge fund to have its own
capital to pledge in order to borrow cash. Either way, because counterparty
default risks disappear, we assume the hedge fund engages in term loans and








j,t···T) − (1 + r
R,A
k,t···T) (6)
where the R superscript indicates repo rates. Subtleties and indirect costs
associated with the above trades are discussed later in the empirical section.
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2 Measuring excess proﬁts from CIP arbi-
trage
2.1 Data for unsecured CIP arbitrage
Moving from theory to data, we make one simpliﬁcation. Equation (5) re-
quires data on OIS rates in two currency markets as well as half spreads on
future overnight money market rates. But the latter are not know to the
trader at time t, nor are they available to us. More importantly, these are
likely to be very small, especially compared to the size of deviations from
CIP that we document later. For estimation purposes we therefore simplify










j,t···T) − (1 + r
O,A
k,t···T) (7)
Note that had we not assumed that the trader hedged her interest rate
risk, we would have been in a much worse position to estimate ex-ante ar-
bitrage proﬁts. Indeed, as per equation (2), we would have had to know
and aggregate traders’ expectations of future overnight interest rates. For-
tunately, this is precisely what is contained in the OIS rates in the above
equation.
To match this payoﬀ, we use data that is (i) synchronous across secu-
rities, (ii) representative of participating institutions, and (iii) close to ﬁrm
quotes. Data were acquired from Tullet Prebon (TP), a leading interme-
diary in wholesale ﬁnancial markets facilitating the trading activities of its
large client base, including ﬁnancial institutions, brokers, market makers and
hedge funds.
First, data used are perfectly synchronous across the forex and money
markets considered, coming from four daily snaps at 9am, 11am, 4pm and
11pm, London time. The ﬁrst, third and fourth time snaps capture the
trading hours of, respectively, the European and Asian, European and US,
and US and Asian markets. The second time snap coincides with the Libor
ﬁxing.
Second, while all prices are market prices, they are technically indicative.
Yet, they are very close to actually traded prices. This is because TP clients
emitting quotes often end up trading on the TP platform. Thus, the TP
platform is not a venue for marketing purposes. This is especially true for
forward contracts for which there are few alternative platforms to trade. It
is somewhat less the case for forex spot transactions, where the common
alternative is ICAP’s Electronic Brokering Services (EBS). A comparison
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suggests TP data is very close to actual traded prices on EBS.4
Finally, data cover EURUSD, USDCHF, USDJPY, GBPUSD, as well as
a EURCHF, the later serving as a control rate not involving the dollar. In
each case, data cover spot rates, and as well as relevant OIS and forward
contracts of 1 week as well as 1, 3, 6, 8, 12 and 24 month maturities. In each
case, data are for both bid and ask quotes and span from March 2006 to end
of April 2009.5
2.2 Data for secured CIP arbitrage
Data on interbank repo rates are notoriously diﬃcult to obtain. We acquired
data on USD interbank repo rates from ICAP whose BrokerTec trading plat-
form accounts for over half the interbank repo market in the US. Data are
actual traded prices and cover several daily snaps, although we use data
from market opening, at 7.45 am New York time, where trading is most liq-
uid. Furthermore, data are for GC as well as Agency collateral, and cover
overnight, one week as well as long term maturities. Liquidity is highest for
overnight contracts, although substantial liquidity still exists for one week
maturities. We focus on the latter contract so as to replicate arbitrage strate-
gies of some duration, as in the unsecured case. Lastly, and importantly, we
use repo rate on GC collateral. Not only are these most liquid, but they
are also much more closely comparable to repo rates in other currency mar-
kets where similar collateral pools of government bonds are oﬀered. Also,
using data from non-GC collateral is misleading as rates often reﬂect the
special nature of speciﬁc collateral, making data much more volatile and less
representative of a benchmark borrower.
Eurex AG were gracious enough to share their data on EUR interbank
repo rates, on the basis of the close working relationship between Eurex
and the Swiss National Bank. Again, data are traded prices and stem from
Eurex’s GC Pooling platform accounting for a very substantial share of in-
terbank repo trading for ECB GC collateral (corresponding to the ECB’s
deﬁnition of GC collateral). Comparable CHF GC repo rates are from the
Swiss National Bank; this is the only repo dataset for which we also have
bid and ask quotes. In both cases, data are for overnight as well as one week
term contracts. Again, we focus on the latter.
4Average diﬀerences in bid-ask quotes between 2007-2008 were less than 1 pip, diﬀer-
ences greater than 2 pips only occurred 5%, without ever surpassing 7 pips.
5Forward rates are expressed in “pips” to be divided by 104 and added to the spot rate.
Note also that OIS rates are annualized and thus needed to be adjusted by a multiplier
in order to be consistent with their maturity. The multiplier is µ = T/360 where T is
maturity in days, except for sterling and yen for which the denominator is 365.
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In both the EUR and CHF cases, we have daily trade histories. We
therefore pick the trade that is closest to 2 pm London Time, in order to
coincide with USD repo data. This unfortunately does not allow us to be
perfectly synchronous with the forex market data, although using snaps from
11 am or 4 pm London time barely changes estimated excess returns.
2.3 Summary of ﬁndings
We begin with excess returns from unsecured arbitrage, covering a richer
dataset of currencies, then proceed to secured arbitrage. Figure 2 shows ex-
cess returns in percentage points for 1 month arbitrage trades in the “USD
group” (EURUSD, USDCHF, USDJPY, GBPUSD), where each trade is la-
beled according to its corresponding spot position (as explained earlier, a
long EURUSD trade involves borrowing in dollars and lending in euros).
In each case, excess proﬁts are very close to zero in the pre-crisis phase,
up to August 2007 (often even slightly negative because of transaction costs).
Then, proﬁts increase in both level and volatility during the crisis phase, and
peak at the time of the Lehman bankruptcy to the very substantial level of
30 bps over one month, or 360 bps on an annualized basis. Thereafter CIP
proﬁts remain surprisingly high until year-end (on average 120 bps annual-
ized). The second peak in excess proﬁts can most likely be associated with
window dressing typically visible at end of year, where ﬁnancial ﬁrms unwind
positions to favor liquid and safe assets on their balance sheets. Since 2009,
proﬁts decreased substantially and remained modest, if at all positive, albeit
with sustained volatility. As a comparison, Akram, Rime, and Sarno (2008)
study CIP deviations from tick-by-tick data in 2004 over various currency
pairs. They ﬁnd that annualized mean returns from CIP arbitrage range
from 2 to 15 pips and last between 2 to 16 seconds.
Figure 3, instead, plots excess proﬁts for the reverse of the above trades,
where a long spot position becomes short. In each case, proﬁts are negative
throughout the sample, especially during the Lehman phase, as expected.
The ﬁgure is not a perfect mirror image of the ﬁrst, though, due to the
inclusion of bid-ask spreads which change the price of going long or short in
any one currency.
The above can be contrasted with excess proﬁts from CIP trades on the
EURCHF rate, shown in ﬁgure 4. In this case, CIP arbitrage proﬁts are
negative throughout the sample, independently of the direction of trade,
namely with either short or long spot positions. Volatility did increase during
the Lehman phase, but this only made excess proﬁts more negative. At the
end of sample, in April 2009, excess proﬁts had returned to normal levels.
Two important takeaways emerge from the above ﬁgures. First, excess
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proﬁts are currency speciﬁc: they include trades where the dollar is present.
Second, excess proﬁts are directional: they emerge when the dollar is be-
ing shorted on the spot market. These two elements are key guideposts to
formulate and test a hypothesis explaining the breakdown of CIP arbitrage.
Excess returns from secured arbitrage are presented in ﬁgures 5 and 6.
Taking a cue from the above ﬁndings, results are only presented for arbitrage
long in EURUSD and short in USDCHF, over a 1 week term. In both cases,
results are compared to the unsecured payoﬀs over the same term. Note ﬁrst
that excess returns also spike at the time of the Lehman bankruptcy, but
for approximately two and one months, respectively, thus less than in the
unsecured case. This is primarily a result of the shorter term of arbitrage,
a relation that is explored more systematically in the robustness checks to
this paper’s empirical section. Second, and importantly, excess returns from
secured arbitrage are nearly exactly equal to those from unsecured arbitrage.
This is especially true for arbitrage in EURUSD, although while a slight gap
opens in the case of USDCHF arbitrage, co-movement between unsecured
and secured arbitrage proﬁts is very high. This will play an important role
in the following empirical analysis. Finally, the absence of the second peak
in excess proﬁts is probably due to the shorter 1 week maturity trade not
going over year end, and thus not being aﬀected by window dressing activity.
2.4 A brief comparison to the literature
Recall from the introduction that most papers examining the stability of the
CIP condition assume a trader uses unsecured term money market instru-
ments proxied by Libor rates, often ignoring transaction costs. The intro-
duction to this paper summarized the main issues with such an approach.
None-the-less, we reproduce the methodology for the sake of comparison,
and call results “Libor proﬁts”. We contrast these with this paper’s excess
returns from unsecured arbitrage, which we label “OIS proﬁts”. Both cases
explore a long EURUSD spot position.
The two measures are shown in ﬁgure 7. The lighter line plots OIS proﬁts
and the darker, Libor proﬁts. Generally, the two illustrate a similar pattern.
Yet notable diﬀerences arise and, importantly, are time varying. These vari-
ations stem from Libor-OIS spreads moving unequally across countries. For
instance, in periods when Libor-OIS spreads grow more in the target coun-
try j relative to the funding country k, an upward bias is introduced when
measuring CIP arbitrage proﬁts with Libor instead of OIS rates, since proﬁts
depend positively on target rates. The reverse is of course also true. Thus,
Libor-OIS spreads are a mechanical yet substantive driver of ﬂuctuations in
CIP “Libor proﬁts”. For this reason, the papers that explain CIP “Libor
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proﬁts” with Libor-OIS spreads are in fact mostly regressing a variable on
itself, thereby undermining their claim that risk mostly explains arbitrage
deviations.
To close, ﬁgure 8 shows the bid-ask spreads related to CIP arbitrage.
Average spreads in the forex market, both spot and forward, became more
volatile after the start of the crisis in August 2007, but did not increase
substantially until the Lehman phase. Only in April 2009 were spreads back
to pre-crisis levels. Average OIS spreads instead grew in a step like fashion
during the crisis phase, and followed forex spreads in a stunning jump during
the Lehman phase. Spreads on funding markets were still at elevated levels
in April 2009.
3 Explaining excess proﬁts from CIP arbi-
trage
3.1 Risk and liquidity factors
Why would excess returns from CIP arbitrage have turned positive during
the ﬁnancial crisis? The general answer will come in the ﬂavor of rationing of
funds, limiting arbitrage. Higher – perhaps much higher – interest rates alone
would not oﬀer a plausible explanation, since the CIP condition should hold
for any interest rate diﬀerential. We focus the following discussion around
two main explanations of market rationing: one emphasizing risk and the
other liquidity factors. In each case, explanations can be linked back to a
speciﬁc player and transaction in ﬁgure 1.
On the risk side, we isolate three causes of excess proﬁts from CIP arbi-
trage. The ﬁrst involves the forward transaction between the trader and its
forex counterparty. It is therefore shared between both unsecured and se-
cured arbitrage. The risk is that this counterparty defaults during the term
of arbitrage; we therefore refer to contract risk. This is as emphasized in
Duﬃe and Huang (1996) and Melvin and Taylor (2009). As a result, the
trader would have to close or renew her trading strategy by engaging in a
reverse spot transaction, or acquiring a new forward contract. In either case,
the trader exposes herself to exchange rate risk.
Second, the trader is exposed to rollover risk, but only in so far as arbi-
trage is unsecured. Indeed, her unsecured trading strategy involves rolling
over overnight money market positions. At any point, though, lender L may
stop rolling over the trader’s debt, or her management may stop her from
renewing her credit to borrower B. This would oblige the trader to terminate
her arbitrage strategy early, thereby exposing her to exchange rate risk, as
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above, as well as to the cost of foregone proﬁts. These stem from the ma-
turity structure of overnight interest rate diﬀerentials; if it is elevated early
in the term of arbitrage and ﬂat thereafter, potential costs diminish, and
vice a versa. Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009), among others, focus on
rollover risk as stemming from investor sentiment, and potentially leading to
market freezes.6
Third, the trader faces counterparty default risk, as recently emphasized
by Taylor and Williams (2009) relative to money market spreads more gen-
erally. Again, the risk is speciﬁc to the unsecured arbitrage strategy. Specif-
ically, if borrower B were to default, the trader loses the principal of her
loan. The risk is usually small, given the overnight maturity, but existent
none-the-less, and potentially dissuasive of lending at times of extreme crisis.
On the side of liquidity, we again isolate three potential causes of excess
proﬁts from CIP arbitrage. First, there is evidence that banks were under se-
vere pressure to deleverage during the crisis and especially after the Lehman
bankruptcy. The impressive extent to which ﬁnancial institutions delever-
aged is documented and discussed in Adrian and Shin (2008b) and McCauley
and McGuire (2009), among others. Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) also fo-
cus on deleveraging, and suggest a model in which assets with lower margin
requirements – with less impact on the balance sheet – can trade at lower
prices.7 Finally, Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2010) suggests
that during the crisis the pressure to deleverage was exacerbated by having
to honor prior commitments to credit lines, mostly in USD; the paper docu-
ments the sharp drop in new loans emanating especially from banks needing
to deleverage. Whatever the deeper cause of deleveraging, either strategic or
structural, the phenomenon can be captured in our conceptual framework as
lender L needing to decrease the size of its balance sheet, thereby reducing
6Of other papers emphasizing sentiment shocks, one of the founding papers is Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) and Pagano (1989), emphasizing self fulﬁlling prophecies. In the papers
that have followed, investor sentiment continues to play a central role, as in Acharya,
Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009), as does the availability of information, as in Hombert and
Thesmar (2009) and Morris and Shin (2009), where imperfect knowledge of aggregate
losses is paramount. On the empirical side, several papers have focussed on measuring
liquidity freezes and relevant policy responses. Some of these are Cecchetti and Disyatat
(2009), Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) and Sarkar (2009).
7Other papers also emphasize feedback from balance sheets to asset prices, as Acharya
and Viswanathan (2007) and Benmelech and Bergman (2009). Other papers empha-
size other, although related, factors, such as the structure of ﬁnancial institutions, as in
Diamond and Rajan (2005), He and Krishnamurthy (2008b) and Duﬃe (2009), that of
markets, as in Allen and Gale (2003) and Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009), or market
imperfections as in Mancini Griﬀoli (2009) and Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009)
which emphasize adverse selection.
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both unsecured and secured lending, thereby choking oﬀ arbitrage.
The second reason why lender L may have cut back, or cut oﬀ, both
unsecured and secured loans to arbitrageurs is prudential, as illustrated in
part by McGuire and von Peter (2009). By 2008, banks had accumulated
substantial dollar assets, funded mostly on a very short term basis on un-
secured terms. When the funding markets dried up and when the assets in
question became illiquid, banks faced a severe funding strain. Thus, they
hoarded liquidity. Doing so had negative externalities, as funding liquidity
became all the more scarce and expectations of future liquidity worsened.
The situation was exacerbated by signaling dynamics: banks didn’t want to
be caught by their peers scrambling for liquidity and they knew that posting
suﬃcient liquidity was essential to maintain their credit rating. As a result,
banks gave up on lending proﬁts to build up a liquidity pool mostly in USD.
These dynamics emphasizing the vicious circle between market and funding
liquidity, as well as cross market contagion eﬀects are modeled more explicitly
in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Shin (2008a) and Gromb
and Vayanos (2009), and eloquently discussed in Brunnermeier (2009) and
Pedersen (2009).
Finally, the third reason why arbitrage may have broken down in CIP is
speciﬁc to the trader engaged in secured arbitrage. Borrowing on secured
terms requires capital to cover margins or haircuts. The presumption here
is that traders, or hedge funds more speciﬁcally, were scrambling for capital
especially following the Lehman bankruptcy. On the one hand, funds faced
increasing redemptions and on the other, they incurred heavy losses on their
portfolios. In a time when raising equity was nearly impossible, available cap-
ital became scarce. Due to this constraint, funds were not able to engage in
lucrative arbitrage trades. The role played by capital constraints is reviewed
with particular clarity in Gromb and Vayanos (2010). It is also at the heart
of the models in Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2009), Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), Kondor (2009), He and Krishnamurthy (2008b,a), Liu and
Longstaﬀ (2004), Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
among others.
3.2 Variables, speciﬁcation and methodology
The earlier section laid out potential explanations for excess proﬁts from
CIP arbitrage. These were categorized as mostly involving risk or liquidity
factors. The following sections aim to empirically test which explanations
seem most correlated to measured excess returns. The general procedure
is to regress excess returns from CIP arbitrage on several variables, each of
which is intended to capture one of the explanations advanced above. We
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start by listing and justifying these variables, all of which are summarized in
Table 1.
On the side of risk, we had highlighted exchange rate risk from having
to renegotiate a forward contract, or taping the spot market to terminate
arbitrage. We capture this with 1 month forex option implied volatilities.
Rollover risk, only present in unsecured arbitrage, also implied early termi-
nation of arbitrage. We capture this with the one week to one month OIS
diﬀerentials in currency j relative to those in currency k. This corresponds
to potentially lost arbitrage revenue from closing positions after one week
instead of the planned one month. And ﬁnally we use a CDS index of US
ﬁnancial institutions to track counterparty default risk, also speciﬁc to un-
secured arbitrage. To these we add a more general measure of risk, drawn
from the VIX index for equities.
On the side of liquidity, we had ﬁrst mentioned the impetus to deleverage.
We capture this using the measure of balance sheet size of ﬁnancial interme-
diaries developed in Adrian and Shin (2008a). Second, we had emphasized
prudential hoarding of USD liquidity, which we track with cash deposits with
Federal Reserve Banks in excess of reserve balances. Finally, we had raised
the prospects of capital constraints to obtain secured funding. Finding a
clean related measure is diﬃcult and, to our knowledge, the literature of-
fers little guidance. None-the-less, we draw inspiration from Coﬀey, Hrung,
Nguyen, and Sarkar (2009) and suggest using a spread between Agency MBS
and GC repo rates. The idea is that as capital becomes scarce, lenders are
in a position to extract higher rents in the form of higher repo rates. All
repos become specials, in a way. Yet, the presumption is that the eﬀect is
stronger on repos with slightly riskier collateral as are MBS relative to GC.
To these, we add two more general liquidity measures: First, TED spreads,
as in Brunnermeier (2009) and Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009),
implying that liquid capital is withdrawn from markets when it ﬂies to high
quality government bonds, and second Libor-OIS spreads. These measures,
though, could also represent a heightened perception of risk, both general
and of counterparty default. To a certain extent, the same is true of the
other liquidity variables. Thus, when testing for liquidity eﬀects, we always
also control for risk using the earlier mentioned risk variables. This includes
leaving CDS spreads in the regressions for secured arbitrage.
Furthermore, we test for the relevance of liquidity constraints on excess
proﬁts by including two variables tracking policy measures to enhance liq-
uidity. If signiﬁcant and with the appropriate negative sign, these variables
would not only signal that policy was eﬀective, but would explain why ex-
cess proﬁts from CIP arbitrage were eventually resorbed. The ﬁrst of these
policy variable is the Fed’s “reserve bank credits”, and the second USD swap
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lines extended by the Fed to other central banks (BOE, BOJ, ECB, SNB).
Reserve bank credits include securities held outright, but more importantly
repos, term auction credits, other loans, as well as credit extended through
the commercial paper funding facility and the money market investor funding
facility. While these measures had the goal of improving funding liquidity
issues generally, on a variety of markets, swaps were more precisely targeted
at solving the issue of dollar funding abroad.
A ﬁnal two variables are considered, intended to capture market liquidity
more generally. These are measures of bid-ask spreads in the funding market
(on the two OIS transactions) and forex market (on both the spot and forward
transaction). Speciﬁcally, in the same spirit as Korajczyk and Sadka (2008),
we take the ﬁrst principal component of the bid-ask spreads of each market’s
relevant transactions. Two latent liquidity variables arise: one for the forex
market and one for the OIS or funding market.8
In the end, we estimate the following equation,
zt = α + ν
￿zt−1 + β
￿ Θt + γ
￿Ψt + δ
￿Σt + ￿t (8)
where Θt is a matrix including the “market liquidity” variables, Ψt is a ma-
trix of “funding liquidity” measures, and Σt is a matrix of variables capturing
various facets of “risk”. Note that all variables are taken in growth rates,
as it is primarily the impact of the tightening of funding liquidity on the
explosion of excess proﬁts from CIP arbitrage that interests us. Results
with variables in levels are discussed in the robustness checks. Estimation
is carried out both for the EURUSD times series and for a panel including
EURUSD, USDJPY, GBPUSD, and USDCHF. The former is estimated us-
ing OLS with Newey-West standard errors, and the latter using Seemingly
Unrelated Regression with ﬁxed eﬀects, exchange rate speciﬁc constants and
autoregressive coeﬃcients.
3.3 Estimation results
Regression results are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4, where the ﬁrst two
tables correspond to 1 month unsecured arbitrage and the last to 1 week
8The FX latent liquidity variable is deﬁned as the ﬁrst principle component (FPC)
of the bid-ask spreads of the exchange rates (both spot and forward rates) against the
USD. The FPC accounts for more than 80% of the overall liquidity and the loadings
are extremely similar across exchange rates. We also tried using a straight average and
found, as expected, very similar results. The OIS latent liquidity variable is deﬁned as the
FPC that accounts for 60% of the total volatility and the loadings are very similar across
currencies (i.e. between 0.42 and 0.54), except for the JPY which has a loading of -0.14.
The exclusion of the latter leaves the results essentially unchanged.
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secured arbitrage. Tables 2 and 4 display results for the EURUSD time series,
and table 3 for the panel. All tables relay results from trades involving short
dollar spot positions; results for the equivalent long dollar spot positions
are not shown as they are nearly the same in magnitude and signiﬁcance,
but have opposite signs, since excess returns are nearly mirror images, as
discussed earlier. In all tables, several regression speciﬁcations are shown,
each testing for a diﬀerent combination of risk and liquidity factors. Finally,
for expositional simplicity, we focus the analysis on the results from unsecured
arbitrage and comment those from secured arbitrage only in so far as these
oﬀer a diﬀerent or similar picture.
We ﬁrst focus on the market liquidity variables. These are highly signif-
icant across the various speciﬁcation in the panel case (Table 2). The OIS
latent liquidity variable loses signiﬁcance when taken with the TED spread,
reminding us that the latter is also a measure of market liquidity. In the
EURUSD time series case, market liquidity variables are less often signiﬁ-
cant, probably because of the more liquid nature of both forex and related
money markets. In all cases the coeﬃcient on forex market liquidity is neg-
ative, suggesting higher bid-ask spreads make for lower excess returns. This
seems straightforward as spreads reﬂect transaction costs which run against
returns. But the always positive coeﬃcient on the OIS latent liquidity vari-
able suggests another interpretation: that bid-ask spreads are also a measure
of funding liquidity. Results suggest that as liquidity becomes depressed on
funding markets – or as spreads increase – excess returns grow. This initial
result already lays its ﬁnger on the importance of liquidity issues.
The next section in the tables focusses precisely on funding liquidity.
Here, the general approach is to test each measure of funding liquidity sep-
arately given the high collinearity between most variables. The policy vari-
ables, though, can be thought of as exogenous; we therefore leave one –
central bank swap lines – in each regression, except when controlling for the
second policy variable, Federal Reserve credits. Note, as mentioned earlier,
that in each regression we control for risk premia potentially aﬀecting our
liquidity variables by including all risk variables.
TED, Libor-OIS spreads, as well as central bank deposits are all highly
signiﬁcant across both time series and panel regressions. Their positive co-
eﬃcients indicate that as funding liquidity decreases (an increase in these
variables), excess proﬁts from CIP arbitrage increase. That is indeed this
paper’s central thesis. The Adrian and Shin measure of balance sheet size,
though, is not signiﬁcant. It does gain signiﬁcance and appears with the
expected negative sign in the regressions studied as robustness checks, when
all other variables appear in levels.
Interestingly, results suggest the policy responses during the crisis were
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very successful at alleviating the constraint on funding liquidity, and thus
contributing to restoring the CIP condition. Coeﬃcients on the reserve cred-
its as well as forex swap lines, in both the time series and panel regressions,
are all highly signiﬁcant. Their negative sign suggests that as these policy
measures were implemented, excess CIP proﬁts decreased. Note that both
variables are taken with a one week lag, to allow for the transmission of pol-
icy. This is when signiﬁcance is highest, although a two week lag, as well as
contemporaneous correlations, are also signiﬁcant.
Next, we move to the risk variables. The implied volatility (IV) variable
is always positive and signiﬁcant in the EURUSD time series regressions,
although the picture is less clear in the more representative panel case. Gen-
erally, though, it would seem that exchange rate risk, from having to rene-
gotiate a forward contract or close one’s positions early by tapping the spot
market, did play some role in propping up excess arbitrage proﬁts.
Results are quite weak for the other risk factors. The CDS and VIX vari-
ables are never signiﬁcant and the interest rate diﬀerential is only signiﬁcant
in half the panel regressions, while it is never so in the time series regres-
sions. Thus, counterparty, rollover and more general risk do not seem to have
played a role in dissuading arbitrage. This is as expected. We had already
mentioned that comparing proﬁts from unsecured and secured arbitrage of-
fered a natural test for the relevance of rollover and counterparty risk. And
indeed, since the two arbitrage strategies yield nearly equal results, these
risks ought not to have played an important role.
We end with a closer look at regression results from secured arbitrage.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that results, on the whole, change only very
little with respect to the case of unsecured arbitrage, even if the term of
arbitrage is diﬀerent. This is certainly the case for the market and funding
liquidity variables, whose importance is thereby emboldened. The CDS and
VIX variables also do not change, in that they remain insigniﬁcant. And
the implied volatility variable loses signiﬁcance in two of the eight cases,
although retains the approximate size of its coeﬃcient. Second, the repo
spread variable (Agency MBS to GC repo spreads) is signiﬁcant, loosely
suggesting that there may have been funding liquidity constraints due to
ﬁnite capital to pledge in exchange.
Generally, then, the above results mostly suggest that CIP deviations can
be explained mostly without recourse to risk factors, except for exchange rate
risk arising from the default of the forward counterparty. Lack of funding
liquidity, and to some extent market liquidity, turn out to be the primary




This section brieﬂy reviews the robustness tests undertaken. For the most
part, results are described verbally for the sake of brevity. None-the-less, any
speciﬁc result is available upon request.
First, we explored the eﬀect of time of day on proﬁts from CIP arbitrage.
Results are nearly unchanged with respect to the benchmark 11.00h time
snap, when using data from the 16.00h time snap when US markets are also
opened.
Second, we explored the eﬀect of maturity on proﬁts from CIP arbitrage.
In general, proﬁts from shorter maturities are less persistent, but higher at
their peak. Thus substantial deviations continue to exist and regression re-
sults hardly change, as already noted earlier, when considering excess returns
from arbitrage over shorter maturities.
Third, we divided the data in sub-samples: a pre-crisis phase, lasting
up to August 2007, a crisis phase, between August 2007 and the Lehman
bankruptcy in September 2008, and a Lehman phase since then. Liquid-
ity variables in both the Θt and Ψt matrices are not signiﬁcant during the
pre-crisis phase. They then become signiﬁcant in the crisis phase, and their
coeﬃcients grow substantially in the Lehman phase. The risk related vari-
ables remain mostly insigniﬁcant throughout, as in the main results presented
earlier.
Fourth, we also checked to see if results changed when using CDS spreads
of European banks instead of US banks. But results are nearly perfectly
unchanged. Again, diﬀerences in cross country risks are peripheral to our
story.
Fifth, results are unchanged to including all explanatory variables in lev-
els. Signs, sizes and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients are particularly stable.
Sixth, the same is true when including all variables explored earlier in
a single regression. The only exception are TED spreads which lose signiﬁ-
cance, due to their collinearity with Libor-OIS spreads.
Seventh, results do not change if the risk variables are included separately
in the regression.
Eighth, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) construct a supplementary measure
of stock market liquidity which has recently received signiﬁcant attention.
Unfortunately, the fact that this measure is monthly did not allow us to
include it directly in our regression. Yet, its correlation with our measures
of liquidity in matrix Θt is more than 80%.
And ﬁnally, in terms of panel estimation, we tried several variants includ-
ing speciﬁc coeﬃcients for the AR term and other estimation methods such
as ARCH Maximum Likelihood (Marquardt). Results remain unchanged.
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4 Conclusion
This paper focussed on limits to arbitrage as illustrated by covered interest
parity, following the Lehman bankruptcy. It described how such arbitrage
trades are actually implemented in practice, using either unsecured or secured
money market transactions. This paper showed how deviations from CIP
arbitrage existed for months after the Lehman bankruptcy, were substantial
and persistent, and mostly involved trades with short dollar spot positions.
These results were found with data which closely resembles what a trader
would have faced at the time of undertaking arbitrage. Data are intra-daily,
synchronized across markets and inclusive of transaction costs. Explaining
such deviations from arbitrage followed a two step process. The ﬁrst laid out
the hypotheses and the second tested each empirically. Results suggest that
it was especially the lack of dollar funding liquidity – due to deleveraging
imperatives, prudential hoarding and limited capital to pledge in exchange
for liqudity – that limited the extent of arbitrage, and thus failed to balance
the CIP condition.
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Figure 1: An illustration of CIP arbitrage: the trader can be thought of as
either a hedge fund or the prop desk of a large ﬁnancial institution. Typically,
the former borrows and lends on secured terms by exchanging cash against
collateral (hashed lines), and the latter does so on unsecured terms (dotted
lines). Both are money market transactions. The trader also engages in two
forex transactions with appropriate counterparties, one spot and one forward.
In all, CIP arbitrage involves four transactions.
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Figure 2: Excess proﬁts from unsecured CIP arbitrage on trades involving a
short USD spot position, over a 1 month term.
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Figure 3: Excess proﬁts from unsecured CIP arbitrage on trades involving a
long USD spot position, over a 1 month term.
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Figure 4: Excess proﬁts from unsecured CIP arbitrage on trades involving
both a long and a short EURCHF spot position.
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Excess proﬁts from uncovered and covered 



































































































































"1W REPO proﬁts", long EURUSD
"1W OIS proﬁts", long EURUSD
Figure 5: Excess proﬁts from CIP arbitrage on trades involving a short USD
spot position, when funding is secured (“repo proﬁts”) and unsecured (“OIS
proﬁts”), over a 1 week term.
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Excess proﬁts from uncovered and covered 






























































































































































































































































"1W REPO proﬁts", short USDCHF
"1W OIS proﬁts", short USDCHF
Figure 6: Excess proﬁts from CIP arbitrage on trades involving a short USD
spot position, when funding is secured (“repo proﬁts”) and unsecured (“OIS
proﬁts”), over a 1 week term.
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"Libor proﬁts", long EURUSD spot
"OIS proﬁts", long EURUSD spot
Figure 7: Excess proﬁts in percentage points from CIP arbitrage with 1
month maturity. “Libor proﬁts” are calculated with Libor rates and match-
ing 11am forex quotes, yet without any transaction costs. “OIS proﬁts” are
calculated with synchronous OIS and forex rates, including transaction costs;



































































































































































































































































BAS Spot Forex (lhs scale)
BAS Fwd Forex (lhs scale)
BAS OIS (rhs scale)
Figure 8: Average bid–ask spreads in the forex spot and forward markets, as
well as OIS market. Bid–ask spreads are calculated as (Ask−Bid)/C where
C is the average midquote.
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Factor Unsecured arbitrage proxy Secured arbitrage proxy
Risks
Contract Implied volatility (IV) Implied volatility (IV)
Rollover Interest diﬀerential NA
Counterparty default CDS NA
General/ controls VIX, CDS VIX/ CDS
Funding liquidity
Deleveraging Balance sheet (CPG) Balance sheet (CPG)
Prudential hoarding CB deposits CB deposits
Limited capital NA Repo spreads
Policy measures CB swaps, CB swaps,
Reserve credits Reserve credits
General/ controls TED, Libor-OIS TED, Libor-OIS
Market liquidity
Transaction costs OIS & FX BAS spreads OIS & FX BAS spreads
Table 1: Summary of various explanatory factors for excess proﬁts from
CIP arbitrage, categorized according to risk, funding liquidity and market
liquidity. Each factor is intended to be captured by a corresponding “proxy”
or variable. Since some factors are not relevant to both unsecured and secured
arbitrage strategies, some proxies are market as not applicable (NA).
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Time series, long EURUSD unsecured CIP arbitrage (1M)
Speciﬁcation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Market Liquidity
FX liquidity -0.021 -0.039 -0.039 -0.032 -0.026 -0.040 -0.041
-0.906 -1.671 -1.747 -1.331 -1.153 -1.573 -2.171
OIS liquidity 0.302 0.321 0.374 0.089 0.129 0.330 0.237
2.661 2.741 3.150 0.740 1.139 2.666 2.924
Funding Liquidity
CB swap -6.704 -4.618 -4.721 -6.743 -7.537












IV 1.697 1.581 0.967 1.397 1.853 1.074
3.104 2.920 1.796 2.763 3.050 2.802
Interest Diﬀ. -0.246 -0.293 -0.205 -0.154 -0.291 -0.124
-1.219 -1.415 -1.102 -0.840 -1.317 -0.939
CDS -0.305 -0.270 -0.477 -0.243 -0.335 0.118
-0.808 -0.704 -1.329 -0.695 -0.776 0.475
VIX 0.446 0.257 0.179 0.075 0.358 -0.191
0.968 0.564 0.393 0.166 0.701 -0.565
Adj. R2 0.040 0.237 0.185 0.345 0.380 0.223 0.637
Table II: Time series results for long EURUSD spot positions. For each vari-
able, estimated coeﬃcients appear above corresponding t-statistics. Numbers
in bold represent signiﬁcance at least at the 10% level. AR(1) coeﬃcients
are all signiﬁcant but not shown to simplify the table.
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Panel, short USD unsecured CIP arbitrage (1M)
Speciﬁcation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Market Liquidity
FX liquidity -0.073 -0.077 -0.083 -0.075 -0.072 -0.079 -0.065
-3.838 -4.014 -4.281 -4.195 -4.455 -3.792 -4.029
OIS liquidity 0.349 0.350 0.387 0.134 0.161 0.354 0.271
3.949 4.050 4.270 1.606 2.216 3.955 4.037
Funding Liquidity
CB swap -5.741 -3.494 -3.854 -5.945 -7.184












IV 0.856 0.587 0.194 0.671 0.929 0.832
2.112 1.406 0.529 2.073 2.081 2.658
Interest Diﬀ. -0.091 -0.072 -0.172 -0.157 -0.103 -0.149
-0.951 -0.712 -2.002 -1.851 -1.002 -1.908
CDS 0.155 0.383 -0.214 0.053 0.221 0.044
0.575 1.354 -0.898 0.245 0.720 0.214
VIX 0.576 0.346 0.182 0.003 0.522 -0.042
1.634 0.952 0.564 0.009 1.365 -0.149
Adj. R2
EURUSD -0.045 0.124 0.012 0.281 0.298 0.101 0.614
USDJPY 0.006 0.246 0.098 0.446 0.514 0.253 0.436
GBPUSD 0.127 0.171 0.128 0.295 0.381 0.142 0.402
USDCHF -0.061 0.133 -0.033 0.306 0.404 0.115 0.528
Table III: Panel results for USD group exchange rates, involving short USD
spot positions. For each variable, estimated coeﬃcients appear above corre-
sponding t-statistics. Numbers in bold represent signiﬁcance at least at the
10% level. AR(1) coeﬃcients are all signiﬁcant but not shown to simplify
the table.
xi36
Time series, long EURUSD secured CIP arbitrage (1W)
Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Market Liquidity
FX liquidity -0.062 -0.065 -0.067 -0.080 -0.068 -0.053 -0.086 -0.092
-1.539 -1.626 -1.609 -2.072 -1.714 -1.222 -2.639 -2.433
OIS liquidity 0.746 0.776 0.854 0.491 0.658 0.765 0.738 0.483
4.166 4.568 4.536 2.899 3.857 4.369 5.673 2.976
Funding Liquidity
CB swap -10.413 -8.128 -9.371 -9.860 -12.529 -7.637














IV 1.521 0.803 1.013 1.515 1.611 1.379 0.887
1.983 0.977 1.419 2.043 1.909 2.372 1.291
CDS 0.099 0.264 -0.003 0.166 0.239 0.284 -0.114
0.205 0.494 -0.007 0.357 0.438 0.778 -0.191
VIX 0.379 0.011 -0.167 -0.022 0.087 -0.300 -0.138
0.579 0.015 -0.268 -0.033 0.123 -0.581 -0.325
Adj. R2 0.159 0.267 0.156 0.357 0.298 0.260 0.528 0.396
Table IV: Time series results for long EURUSD spot positions. For each vari-
able, estimated coeﬃcients appear above corresponding t-statistics. Numbers
in bold represent signiﬁcance at least at the 10% level. AR(1) coeﬃcients
are all signiﬁcant but not shown to simplify the table.
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